The choice between salaried work and entrepreneurship has often been studied through the lenses of ability and wealth-related explanations. Nevertheless, recent literature documents that entrepreneurs earn less income than comparable workers, and points to non-pecuniary motives' role in entrepreneurial decisions. In this paper, I focus on the exibility of hours as a motive for engaging in entrepreneurial activity. Dening exibility as the ability to modify hours of work without sacricing hourly income, I develop a model that gives inexibility for salaried workers. Importantly, this arises as a general equilibrium eect due to complementarities between workers' hours. In a setting featuring volatile value of leisure, such inexibility can be crucial to individuals' self-selection into entrepreneurship. I show that the exible hours motive, disciplined with the observed occupation-specic patterns in hours (level, persistence, dispersion) and income (persistence, dispersion), is strong enough to generate the observed dierentials in income levels. Together with this contribution, the proposed setting provides a rich environment to evaluate public policies involving restrictions on working hours. I show that imposing maximum hours in the US can make the salaried work a better option for those who otherwise nd it hard to keep up with the working hours in the economy. In particular, individuals that are entrepreneurs before the reform only to avoid undesirable hours can nd it optimal to become workers. In turn, such a policy can increase the number of workers and their total hours, as well as the average productivity of entrepreneurs.
Introduction
Factors aecting the selection into entrepreneurship determine the observed characteristics of rm owners, hence, change the productivity and output patterns of their rms (e.g. levels, volatility). Moreover, entrepreneurs are potential workers, which gives a direct link between entrepreneurship and the size of the labor force available for employment. Accordingly, identifying the motives for entrepreneurship, and capturing the economic mechanisms underlying these motives are important for studying the rm-level and aggregate productivity patterns, as well as the aggregate labor in the economy.
Standard macroeconomic theory on entrepreneurship treats the choice between salaried work and entrepreneurship mainly as a matter of productivity. In the seminal work by Lucas (1978) , agents are assumed to consider their relative innate ability of running a rm over being a worker and become entrepreneurs if the pecuniary benets implied by this dierential is high enough. Lucas (1978) model has been improved with features such as nancial constraints and volatility in occupation-specic ability in order to match better the patterns observed in the data including the wealth and income distribution (Buera and Shin (2013) ; Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) ; Midrigan and Xu (2010) ).
Nevertheless, this line of research neglects the observed income dierentials between entrepreneurs and workers. Hamilton (2000) shows that entrepreneurs generate less income than comparable workers. This is also true for any tenure in business, so that switching to salaried work at any time of entrepreneurship would make a business owner income-wise better o. This feature in the data has brought attention to the non-pecuniary benets associated to entrepreneurship. For instance, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) use survey data on business owners to show that the majority of entrepreneurs list non-pecuniary reasons such as exible hours or preferring to be their own boss for starting their businesses. In another recent paper, Pugsley (2011) uses an innate preference for entrepreneurship to explain the observed income dierentials. Recognizing the role of non-pecuniary motives in entrepreneurship is important, but a structural model that highlights the mechanisms accounting for such motives is still missing. In turn, this has prevented the literature from disciplining the explanations with the observed micro patterns other than the income dierentials.
In order to ll this gap, I focus on the exible hours motive for entrepreneurship; as this is one motive that can potentially be quantied using data on hours by workers and entrepreneurs. I document that the patterns of hours of entrepreneurs are very dierent from those of workers. In the cross-section, working hours are more disperse for entrepreneurs than they are for workers. In terms of the individual-specic hours mobility, the distribution of changes in hours are more concentrated at zero for workers than they are for entrepreneurs.
Departing from the highlighted facts, I ask: Is the exible hours motive, disciplined with the observed occupation-specic patterns in hours (level, persistence, dispersion) and income (persistence, dispersion), strong enough to generate the observed dierentials in income levels?
In order to answer this question, I add two features to a standard entrepreneurship model. First, I allow for shocks to the value of leisure. Dening exibility as the ability to change hours without sacricing hourly income, volatile value of leisure creates a preference for exibility. Second, I introduce a labor aggregation technology that exhibits complementarities between hours of workers. This makes workers more productive if their hours are similar to each other. Hence, it implies wages that depend on the hours of work and get particularly low for those working too little or too much. As a result of such an endogenous cost of deviating from the usual hours in the economy, the preference for exibility manifests itself as a preference for entrepreneurship.
I use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to calibrate the model for the US. I show that the model can generate the income dierentials between workers and entrepreneurs. Moreover it gives a good t for other untargeted moments such as income and wealth distribution among entrepreneurs.
In order to show the quantitative importance of the proposed features, I compare the model's performance with that of the alternatives ignoring worker complementarity and value of leisure volatility. I show that the complete exibility arising in the absence of complementarities creates a dispersion in workers' hours that is 25 percent larger than the data. The resulting lack of the exibility motive for entrepreneurship generates counterfactually high average income for entrepreneurs. On the other hand, omitting the shocks to the value of leisure takes out an important source of hours variation from the model. I show that the productivity shocks alone, calibrated to match the income dispersion for workers and entrepreneurs, can only generate half of the dispersion observed in hours for these occupations.
The benchmark economy has many workers that are nding it hard to keep up with the long hours of their peers. There are also individuals that are entrepreneurs only to avoid the working hours that are too long for their value of leisure. One nding of this paper is that a modest restriction on the maximum hours of workers can help these people. Such a policy would also increase the number of workers in the economy by bringing unproductive entrepreneurs to salaried work. This increases the average productivity of entrepreneurs. In addition, the increase in the number of workers can be large enough to compensate the fall in the average hours due to such a restriction.
The inability of workers to choose their working hours without sacricing hourly income has been documented empirically. Dickens and Lundberg (1993) nd that many men are working less than what they would have liked to. Using Current Population Survey, they show that 35 percent of workers would like to change their hours, and 28 percent would like to increase their hours given hourly wage. Stewart and Swaeld (1997) use British survey data to show that 47 percent of male workers in their sample would like to work dierent number of hours at the prevailing wage, than they actually do. Their results point to job insecurity, fear of redundancy and lack of alternative opportunities as reasons for keeping up with an undesired schedule.
1 Altonji and Paxson (1988) show that there is a premium for working an undesirable amount of hours. They argue that rms have strong preferences for hours worked and that there is a xed hours phenomenon. Aaronson and French (2004) use taxation in the US to identify the link between hours and hourly wage. They nd that there is a signicant wage penalty for switching to part time work from full time work for men. Moreover, they argue that the models 1 Similar conclusions on UK workers can be found in Boheim and Taylor (2004). ignoring the nonlinear link between hours and wages are bound to underestimate the eects of income taxation on labor supply. In a recent paper, Rogerson (2011) surveys the literature documenting the inexibilities in labor supply, as well as the studies that exogenously introduce these inexibilities to a standard labor supply model.
He also studies two extensions of the standard model. First extension features exogenously given non-linear wage rate. The second one prohibits the agent to modify the labor supply in the intensive margin once the level of hours has been picked in the beginning of the working life. The way I introduce the inexibility in hours is closer to the rst feature of Rogerson (2011) . Dierently from his model, I build an underlying mechanism to generate the non-linear wage scheme.
It is important to note that this paper does not pursue exible hours as the only determinant of the entrepreneurial behavior, rather as a missing ingredient in previous studies. The model proposed here is general enough to have a group of entrepreneurs that have started a business only because they generate a larger expected income with this decision. In a recent paper, Levine and Rubinstein (2013) show that even though the income dierentials pointed out in Hamilton (2000) exist, there is a subpopulation within the self-employed that (i) earn more than salaried workers, (ii) earn more than other self-employed and (iii) form the smaller portion of the self-employed population. All of these three features arise as an outcome of my model due to the heterogeneity in the volatility of the value of leisure. People whose value of leisure constantly coincide with the average of the population have no exibility motive for being self-employed. This only leaves pecuniary motives as the factors in their decision to start a business. On the other hand, individuals from the rest of the population have an additional exibility motive for being an entrepreneur. Hence, the former group on average earns more than the latter, and -assuming that the size of the two groups are similar enough -constitutes a smaller fraction of entrepreneurs.
In Section 2, I provide evidence from the US suggesting that volatile preferences and inexible hours can be playing a role in individuals' decision of entrepreneurship. Section 3 introduces the benchmark model and denes the equilibrium. Section 4 explains the calibration and Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 discusses the role of main features of the benchmark model and shows the consequences of various alternative specications. I include the policy analysis in Section 7 and I discuss the implications of restrictions on hours worked. Section 8 concludes.
Empirical evidence
In this subsection, I use the SIPP data to clarify the motivation of this paper and show that hours for entrepreneurs are much more spread in time-scale with a mean higher than workers, they are much more volatile than those of workers and the movements in hours are not necessarily due to changes in hourly income. SIPP provides micro-level panel data, with an interval of four months between each wave and with around ten waves within each panel. In addition to standard characteristics such as sex, marital status, race, disability and education, it collects information about occupation, hours and income.
2 I pool panels 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008 together, to form a sample of school-leavers of ages 18 to 65. I exclude casual businesses and people in agriculture. In the sample, individuals are either workers or entrepreneurs.
3
In order to condition out the factors that are not features of my model, I rst regress hours and hourly income on sex, marital status, race, disability, education, potential job experience, year dummies and the interactions between these variables.
4 Then I adjust the residuals such that the minimum in the sample is equal to 0 and the mean is equal to that of the corresponding dependent variable. This gives the measures of conditional hours and hourly income (hence the total income) that I will use for the rest of the paper. Table 1 describes the moments for the sample, sequentially excluding owners of large (≥ 100 employees) and small businesses (< 100 employees) to show how these groups are dierent. In the rest of the paper I exclude entrepreneurs with large enterprises for two reasons. The focus in my model is hours worked by entrepreneurs, and big businesses are less likely to show a strong relationship between entrepreneurial hours and income. Moreover, SIPP data only includes categorical information for the size of a rm, these categories being less than or equal to 24 employees, between 25 and 99 employees and more than or equal to 100 employees. Hence, including the third category in the sample and not knowing the actual upper bound of employment for this group can make harder the comparison with other sources of rm-level data.
5
The table shows that entrepreneurs earn less, both in terms of the mean and the median, than workers.
Moreover, only 36 percent of entrepreneurs earn more than the median worker. In terms of the dispersion, one can notice that the income of entrepreneurs has a larger standard deviation than that of workers; though this distinction is not as visible in the left panel of Figure 1 plotting the distribution of income for the two occupational groups.
6
Hours worked by the two occupational groups also exhibit dierent patterns. To begin with, an average entrepreneur works more than an average worker. This dierence, considered together with the income dierentials, is in line with entrepreneurs having an average hourly income smaller than workers. Similar to income, hours worked by entrepreneurs also vary more in the cross-section than hours of workers. Dierently from the patterns observed for income, both tails of the hours distribution by entrepreneurs are clearly fatter than the one of workers.
2 Information in hours in the data is the one of the usual hours worked over the reference period (last four months). Income, however, corresponds to the last month only. To allow for matching the income with hours, I assume that the income in the last month is the same with the average over the last four months.
3 I classify people as entrepreneurs if they have had at least one business in the reference period and they worked more hours in their business than in their paid jobs (if they had any). Workers are people who have had at least one paid job in the reference period and worked every week in the last month. I take casual businesses as those that report that they have not withdrawn more than $2500 in the last 12 months from their businesses, or that they have no expectation to do so in the next 12 months.
4 Due to the high volume of explanatory variables, I omit the results of these regressions in this paper, and they are available upon request. The R-squared statistics in hours and hourly income regressions are 0.12 and 0.06 respectively.
In addition to dierences in the cross-sectional variation, hours in the two occupations are notably dierent in volatility. As a rst look, Figure 2 depicts the change in hours worked by people who have the same occupation in two consecutive periods. One can note that hours by entrepreneurs are more volatile. Interestingly, the pattern in levels and dierences of hours is the same if we look at hours not explained by the hourly income. In Figure 3, one can see the corresponding gures of the distribution of levels and changes in hours by two occupations, once controlled for the hourly income. Notice also from Table 1 that the mean absolute change of hours is larger for entrepreneurs than that for workers, and there is little dierence in this comparison if one looks at the absolute change in hours not explained by hourly income.
In order to quantify further the dierences in the volatility of hours by the two occupational groups, I next run simple OLS regressions with the absolute changes in hours as the dependent variable in a sample that only includes people that keep their occupation between two consecutive waves. As shown in Table 2 , rst I only include the dummy variable of being an entrepreneur and get signicantly positive eects of it on the absolute change in hours. This relation is true, when I include the characteristics that I used earlier to get the conditional measures of hours and hourly income. As the dierences between gures 2 and 3 are minimal, it is useful to do the estimations in columns 1 and 2, but also conditioning on the changes in the hourly income, to see that the driving force in the changes in working hours are not only the changes in productivity. In fact, corresponding estimations in columns 3 and 4 show that the eects of being an entrepreneur is still signicant, and that the larger dierences for entrepreneurs are robust to controlling for the changes in productivity.
This suggests that
there is some other mechanism leading to dierences in hours that does not have much to do with pecuniary returns to working.
A candidate mechanism aecting hours can be shocks to the value of leisure, which can be interpreted as shocks to the supply of labor. Correspondingly, it is useful to come up with some measures in the data to capture these shocks to see (i) how signicantly they change the hours worked by people, and in turn (ii) how big of a role they play in switches to entrepreneurship. This is what I do next. In particular, I use two dierent variables to proxy the arrival of shocks on the value of leisure: absolute changes in the family size and a change in the marital status. Including these as explanatory variables, I then run two sets of OLS estimations. First, continuing with the exercise in Table 2 , I show the signicant eects of these shocks on the change in hours worked. Once arguing that such demographic changes create the need for changing hours, second thing to do is to show the eect of these shocks on the decision of starting a business.
The rst variable, changes in the family size, can capture the arrival of a child, which would have an impact 7 There are two notes to be made regarding these estimations. First, R-squared statistics that the explanatory power of these regressions is small. However, this is not a concern for the purposes of this section, since the aim is to show the eects of being an entrepreneur after conditioning out various factors. Meanwhile it should be mentioned that R-squared statistics do not increase substantially once the interaction terms are included for the dummies used in the second regression. Second, including the changes in hourly income creates simultaneity issues, as hours might be aecting the productivity and hourly income. Running the same regressions while instrumenting the changes in hourly income with levels or changes of hourly income in previous periods do not change the results. Third, controlling for the job categories also makes little dierence. The latter two notes also apply for the later estimations using hourly income changes to explain the changes in hours.
on the value of leisure of the parents. It can also capture the death of a family member, hence the presence of an individual in the family with critical health condition for an interval between two waves necessitating time allocated for health care. I use the second variable, changes in the marital status, with the aim of capturing the changes in the value of leisure in the rst few months in a new marriage or in the adjustment period to the single life.
In order to see if these variables indeed have some explanatory power regarding the need for changing hours, I rst run OLS estimations with changes in hours as the dependent variable, as in Table 2 , but now including the family size change and the change in marital status as independent variables. Table 3 summarizes these results.
To facilitate comparison with Table 2 , the rst column gives the results of the nal estimation in that table.
Column 2 adds the absolute change in the family size as the independent variable, and shows that the coecient for this variable is positive and signicant. Then I do the same for the change of the marital status obtaining qualitatively similar results. Finally, I use both proxy variables for the preference shocks in the same estimation.
Notice that the coecients for both variables are signicantly positive.
8
According to the mechanism pursued here, variables necessitating the change in the hours worked, would make exible hours -hence entrepreneurship -more desirable. In order to see the plausibility of this logic, I regress the switch to entrepreneurship on the proxies I used above for the shocks on the value of leisure. I start with the absolute change in the number of individuals in a family between two waves. Table 4 shows the results. In the rst column, I only include the family size change as the independent variable. In the second column, I control for various characteristics and time dummies. Notice that, for both estimations, the magnitude of a change in the population is positively associated with switching to entrepreneurship. Finally, I control for the hourly income in the previous period, which can have important explanatory power for this switch and the changes in the results are minimal.
9 As columns 4 to 6 show, the results are similar to the ones obtained with the former proxy. Changes in the marital status make a switch to entrepreneurship more likely. In addition, I show in column 7 that, the eects of the two proxies are signicantly positive, if they are both included as explanatory variables in the regression.
10
Though not conclusive, evidence given in this subsection supports the ndings in the literature in three ways.
First, a typical entrepreneur is earning less than a typical worker. Second, entrepreneurs are working more on average. Third, hours by workers are not as disperse as they are for entrepreneurs, and do not move as much between periods for a given individual, which potentially hints that workers are more constrained in hours.
Another important take is that, the relatively high volatility of hours by workers is not directly related to changes 8 There is certainly room for endogeneity issues in these estimations biasing the estimated coecients. Since the goal is not to estimate a coecient per se and rather show the presence of a potential mechanism aecting the change of hours and switch to entrepreneurship, conclusions of this exercise would not change as long as the issues are not too severe.
9 Instead of the magnitude of the change, using the indicator of a change in the family size or using increases and decreases separately make little dierence. On the other hand, using the lagged or the future change rather than the contemporaneous change results in losing the signicance of this variable. Moreover, introducing all the interactions between the characteristics used in column 2 does not make a big dierence, neither in the explanatory power of the model nor in the signicance of the independent variable of interest.
10 Instead of the absolute change in the marital status, using an indicator for getting married gives similar results. in productivity. Consistently with this, the nal set of evidence suggests that the changes in the value of leisure, proxied by the changes in the household demographics, have signicant explanatory power in hours changes and in switches to entrepreneurship.
Next I introduce the model, which presents a realistic modication of a standard entrepreneurship model in order to account for the facts illustrated above.
Model

Firms
All rms in the economy operate using a Cobb-Douglas production function. In particular, for rm m the output is:
where K m denotes capital, L m is the eective external labor and Z m is the eciency of these two factors.η m governs the returns-to-scale in the production and it is potentially dierent across rms.
Eective labor of a rm is an aggregation across two units consisting of workers with dierent skill levels:
where L mj (y) denotes the aggregate hours of work by skill group y in unit j of rm m. Here κ captures the weight of the rst technology in the overall eective labor. Technologies 1 and 2 dier in the level of complementarity between hours of workers within each skill group. In technology 1, there is perfect substitution across hours of workers; hence the aggregation is the standard sum over the hours of each skill level:
where y is the productivity of each skill group, N m1 (y) denotes the set of workers with skill y in unit 1 of rm m, and {l i } i∈Nm1(y) gives their hours worked. In technology 2, however, there are potential complementarities between hours of workers:
where ρ < 1. In order to abstract from indices of workers, one can rewrite the aggregation in each unit in terms of measure of workers employed with each level of hours worked:
where µ mj (l, y) is the measure of workers with skill y, working l hours for unit j of rm m.
To sum up, the eective labor of each rm comes from two units that are dierent in the way they aggregate hours of engaged workers. While one unit simply sums all eciency units of labor, the other aggregates them such that hours worked by a worker complements those worked by her colleagues within the unit for the same skill level. Hence, the contribution of a worker to the eective labor of the unit depends on her hours as well her peers. To see this, we can use (1) to get the marginal contribution of a worker with labor supply l to unit 2 of rm m:
where I denote the average l ρ for workers with skill level y in this particular unit by:
Equation (2) shows that the contribution of a worker increases with the overall hours in the unit. Moreover, the proximity to peers matters. In particular, the contribution per hours of work is maximized at l * m (y) where
and gets smaller for hours further away from the maximizing point.
11 As I will argue at the end of this section, these are the properties of the proposed labor aggregation that bring inexibility to workers in technology 2.
Following Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) , there are two sectors of rms in the economy:
entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial. These two dier in the eciency of external factors of production and 11 One can show that the suciency conditions are satised for any ρ < 1.
the scale of operation. Productivity of a rm b in the non-entrepreneurial sector is uniform and its production function exhibits constant returns to scale:
Meanwhile, an entrepreneurial rm exhibits decreasing returns representing the limited span of control by entrepreneurs as in Lucas (1978) . The hours worked by entrepreneurs matter in the production of their rms, specically in the eciency of the external factors of production. Formally, for entrepreneur n:
where A n is the underlying productivity, h n is the hours worked by the entrepreneur.
All rms rent capital at price r + δ and hourly labor of a worker with skill level y that works l hours in a period costs w 1 (l, y) and w 2 (l, y) in technologies 1 and 2, respectively.
Consumers
In the economy, there is a continuum of innitely living agents with unit mass. Preferences are represented by:
There are two types of agents, diering in the volatility of their value of leisure. In particular, fraction λ of the population have their value of leisure evolve with the process:
On the other hand, the value of leisure for the rest of the population is uniformly equal to v 0 . I refer to the former group as unstable (U) and the latter as stable (S) for the rest of paper.
An individual can be a worker for technology 1, a worker for technology 2 or an entrepreneur. A it is the entrepreneurial ability that follows the process:
A worker supplies labor either to technology 1 or technology 2, but not to both. Skill level of a worker also evolves stochastically with process:
and variables ξ it , ζ it and it are drawn independently from each other.
Any individual in the economy can become a worker for the technology she prefers at any time. However workers are free to start their businesses only with probability s ∈ (0, 1]. This assumption captures the stochastic nature of the arrival of opportunities for entrepreneurship. In addition, it can be expected that people that are currently employed may lose alertness signicantly for potential arising of business opportunities.
The problem of the consumer
The value function of an individual consumer with wealth a, entrepreneurial ability A, disutility variable v, if it can freely choose the occupation this period, is
where V e is the value of being an entrepreneur and V w is the value of being a worker. Entrepreneurs choose their savings, a ; consumption, c; supply of labor to their rms, h; the capital to be rented for their rms, K; measure of workers with skill level y to work l hours in the unit j ∈ {1, 2}. The value function of entrepreneurs is:
Workers choose their savings, a ; consumption, c; the technology that they will work for, j; and the supply of labor, l. Their value function is
The value of the consumer that was a worker last period and did not receive a business opportunity this period is simply V w (a, A, y, v). The choice of capital and measure of labor to be hired at each level of hours and skill level that maximize the value of entrepreneurship are K n (a, A, y, v) and µ nj (l, y; a, A, y, v) for j ∈ {1, 2}.
The problem of the non-entrepreneurial sector
The problem of the non-entrepreneurial rms is static. They choose how much capital to rent for their rms, K;
the measure of workers with skill level y to work l hours in the unit j ∈ {1, 2}; total eective labor in each subunit of their rms, L j (y), j ∈ {1, 2}; and their total output, Y . To be specic, their maximization problem reads:
The optimal capital of the non-entrepreneurial sector is denoted by K b and measure of labor to be used in each unit is µ bj (l, y) for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium of this economy is an allocation K b , µ bj (l, y), K n (a, A, y, v), µ nj (l, y; a, A, y, v), c i (a, A, y, v), a i (a, A, y, v), l i (a, A, y, v) for i ∈ {N, O}, S(a, A, y, v), Q(a, A, y, v), prices r, w j (l, y) for j ∈ {1, 2}, and timeinvariant distribution ϕ(a, A, v, J) over wealth (a), entrepreneurial productivity (A), worker skill (y), value of leisure (v) and occupation (J ) such that:
• Policy functions solve the problems of consumers.
• K b , and µ bj for j ∈ {1, 2} solve the problem of the non-entrepreneurial sector.
• Asset markets clear. Total capital used by the non-entrepreneurial sector and the entrepreneurial sector is equal to total wealth in the economy.
• Labor markets clear. Total measure of workers demanded by entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial rms for each level of labor productivity y and each level of working hours l ∈ [0, 1] in each technology j ∈ {1, 2} is equal to the corresponding labor supply.
Discussion of the trade-o between exibility and pay
The model does not allow for a fully analytical characterization of the equilibrium. Nevertheless, one can go far enough in deriving the equations for wages to illustrate a worker's trade-o between wage and desirable working hours.
While I leave solving rms' prot maximization problem to the Appendix, an important implication of this solution is that the wage that a worker gets in technology 2 depends on her hours of work, whereas that in technology 1 does not. In particular in equilibrium wages in two technologies satisfy:
and M A and M B denote the set of entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial rms in the economy, respectively.
One can also write the two wage functions in terms of each other:
Once establishing the relationship between wages in two technologies as in equation (3), a couple of main remarks are due. First, even if there were no complementarities in the second technology, wage functions would in general dier, depending on the weight of each technology in the aggregate eective labor (as captured by κ and 1 − κ) and the actual relative size of the labor technologies. In particular, a larger weight of the second technology (low κ) and a larger size of the eective labor in the rst technology (largeL 1
L2
) would imply a higher wage in technology 2 for the same skill level and hours.
Perhaps more interestingly, relative wage in technology 2 also depends on hours of work relative to fellow workers in the same technology with the same skill level. For instance, the maximum hourly wage is achieved with l * (y) where:
Meanwhile the pecuniary benet of working for the second technology fades away as the hours to be worked gets further away from l * (y).
Above ndings suggest that there might be a price of exibility in the labor market. Some individuals that are not in need of working hours far away from the average can benet from working in technology 2, whereas those that have a very high or low value of leisure in a period might nd it optimal to supply labor to the rst technology instead.
However, there is one additional way of having the ability to determine own hours of work and that is being an entrepreneur. In particular, if the need for exibility is very dominant in the economy, crowding of labor in the rst technology can make it too costly to have exibility, and make entrepreneurship a better option for exibility purposes. In order to quantify this role of entrepreneurship, I next turn to the calibration of the model parameters.
Calibration
In SIPP, the relevant information (such as the average weekly hours worked) is updated only with each wave, hence one period in my model corresponds to four months. Accordingly, following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), who take the yearly depreciation rate equal to 0.06, I take δ = 0.02. Following the same paper I assume α = 0.33, I set B = 1 and γ = 1.5. I take the discount rate, β, equal to 0.983 corresponding to a yearly discount factor of 0.95.
There is extensive literature estimating the elasticity of labor supply, which here is the inverse of the parameter φ, with substantial dierences in studies focusing on aggregates and those working on micro surveys. I set φ equal to 2, a value consistent with micro estimates of labor supply elasticity. 12
For the entrepreneurial production function, I choose the span-of-control parameter, η, such that the total income of external labor in the entrepreneurial sector relative to the income of entrepreneurs is equal to the one in the data. In SIPP respondents are asked about the number of workers employed by one's employer at all locations, while the answer has to fall into categories 0-24, 25-99 or larger. The ratio of interest is that of the total income by the workers in the rst two categories to the total income of entrepreneurs, which in this paper corresponds to employers of 99 or less. The relative share of workers in the entrepreneurial sector implied by the model is (1−α)η 1−η . Equating two ratios gives η = 0.504. This value is much lower than the standard range, which is around 0.85. The dierence is due to excluding the entrepreneurs with large businesses. Doing the same derivations in the sample that includes these big businesses gives the span-of-control parameter equal to 0.94. 13
This is consistent with having the non-entrepreneurial sector separately in the model, with a production function exhibiting constant returns to scale.
In order to simplify the benchmark calibration, I set ρ equal to −10 giving a high degree of complementarity between workers' hours, leaving κ, the weight of technology 1 in the aggregate eective labor, as the parameter to control the inexibilities in the labor market. Meanwhile, later in the paper I discuss the consequences of changing ρ.
I approximate the stochastic processes in the model using Rouwenhorst method outlined by Kopecky and 12
The results of the model are robust to changes in the labor supply elasticity parameter. In particular, following the same calibration exercise with the benchmark while setting φ equal to 1 or 4 give similar results. For a survey of the estimations of labor supply elasticity, see Card (1991) . Suen (2010) . I use three grid points for the value of leisure of type U , and two points for the ability process as entrepreneurs and workers. Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) , heteroskedasticity of the entrepreneurial ability is set to maintain the size of the more able group equal to 15 percent of the population, and I set the autocorrelation of worker ability to 0.983.
In the 2005 sample of the Work Orientations Survey collected within International Social Survey Programme, 65 percent of the US sample with ages between 18 and 65 say it is at least important to have a job that allows to decide the times or days to work; while 59 percent think that this is at least as important as getting high income in a job. For the 1996 sample, these numbers are 56 and 57 percent, respectively. Correspondingly, in the benchmark I set λ (i.e. the fraction of people who are in need for exible hours) equal to 0.6. I give the results for cases with λ ∈ {0, 0.4, 0.8, 1} in Section 6.
The remaining parameters to calibrate are A 0 , ρ A , σ A , σ y , v 0 , π v , σ v , κ, ω and s. I set these to match:
average fraction of hours worked by entrepreneurs and workers, autocorrelation of log-hours and log-income by entrepreneurs, standard deviation of log-hours and log-income of entrepreneurs and workers, fraction of entrepreneurs in the population and the fraction of population switching from entrepreneurs to workers. Table 5 summarizes the choice of parameters.
Results
In this section, I present the results from the calibration exercise. Table 6 compares the data and the model counterparts of the targeted moments together with some untargeted ones in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.
The model is able to t the targeted moments perfectly. There are equally many entrepreneurs in the model as there are in the data, which is around 9 percent of the overall population. Entrepreneurs work slightly more than workers on average. Hours and income of entrepreneurs exhibit vastly dierent patterns from workers in terms of the dispersion. In particular, the cross-sectional variation in income is around 94 percent more for entrepreneurs than it is for workers; and for hours this dierence is around 73 percent. The rate of switch between the occupations is quite small, which is around 0.5 percent.
Next, I turn to the t of the model to the data in terms of the untargeted moments. One thing to note is that entrepreneurs in the model earn less than workers, on average, in a fashion similar to the data. In particular, in the data the average entrepreneur earns around 6 percent less than the average worker, and in the model this margin is around 9 percent. Relative income of entrepreneurs is smaller, if one compares the medians instead of the means; both in the model and in the data. The median entrepreneur earns 14 percent less in the data, and 28 percent less in the model, than the median worker.
The t in income dierences is meaningful considering that the mean hours are targeted in the calibration to make entrepreneurs work as much as they do in the data, hence income dierentials are not simple artifacts of dierences in hours worked. In fact, comparison of hourly income shows that entrepreneurs earn less also per hour of work, both in the data and in the model. In terms of the hourly income, mean entrepreneur earns 5 percent less than the mean worker in the data. In the model this dierence is around 16 percent. While the levels and the variation of hours for the two occupational groups are targeted in the benchmark calibration, it is important to note that the distribution of hours in the model are also similar to the data for both occupational groups as illustrated in Figure 4 .
An important moment for comparing the implications of the model with the data is the one of the fraction of entrepreneurs that are earning less than comparable workers. The ratio of entrepreneurs that are earning more than the median worker is 38 percent in the model and 36 percent in the data. The fraction of entrepreneurs with hourly income more than the median worker is smaller than the same moment for the levels, both in the model and the data. In particular, 23 percent of entrepreneurs in the model earn hourly more than the median worker, while this fraction is 30 percent for the data.
In Section 2, I showed that the pattern of changes in hours do not dier if one looks at the hours controlled by productivity of an individual; and argued that this is mostly because the changes in hours are preference-driven.
To see how much of this feature can be replicated by the model, I do the following exercise. I rst look at the mean absolute change in hours by agents with the same occupation two consecutive periods. Then I look at the corresponding change in residual hours, once controlled for productivity (measured as hourly income). In Table 6 one can see that the change in hours for entrepreneurs and workers are replicated well by the model. Importantly, these means are not aected by controlling hours for the productivity, neither in the model nor in the data.
Complementary to these statistics, I show in gures 5 and 6 that patterns of distribution of changes in hours, and in residual hours once controlled for hourly income are matched closely by the model for entrepreneurs.
Next, I compare the implications of the model on income distribution of entrepreneurs with the patterns observed in data. Figure 7 shows the distribution of income generated by entrepreneurs, normalized by the mean income of workers, for both the data and the model. Moreover, Table 7 shows the income distribution by Top 1, 5, 10 and 20 percent of entrepreneurs.
In addition to the distribution of income, one can compare the implications of the benchmark model on distribution of wealth with that in the data. Table 8 shows the wealth held by the top portions, for the data and for the model. Both for the entire population and within entrepreneurs, the model does a decent job in matching the wealth distribution of the data.
14 Finally, Table 6 shows how the selection into entrepreneurship changes with the volatility in preferences over leisure. Not surprisingly, entrepreneurship is more commonly chosen among U-type agents, since they have an additional exibility motive for running their own business. Consequently, S-type entrepreneurs are more 14 Information on wealth does not appear in regular core les used for previous statistics. Only few waves of the topical module overlap with the sample that I am using for this paper. These are waves 3, 6, 9 and 12 of 1996 panel; waves 3, 6 and 9 of 2001 panel; productive on average; making them earn more than the workers of the same type. Notice also that since there are no changes in the preference over leisure, S-type agents do not change their hours worked as much as the U-type.
6 Role of the model features
In this section I focus on dierent assumptions in the benchmark calibration, and discuss the relevance of these for the results. First, I replicate the calibration exercise for alternative degrees of complementarity in technology 2 by altering ρ. In one of these alternatives, I set ρ equal to 1. This is particularly interesting to see the consequences of assuming away the complementarities in the labor market. Second, I depart from the benchmark calibration by assuming dierent sizes of the subpopulation with volatile value of preferences. Among the alternatives that I go over, I include the case with only stable types. This serves as another attempt to compare the benchmark with a standard entrepreneurship model, since shocks to the value of leisure is often ignored in the literature.
Complementarities in the labor aggregation
In the benchmark calibration, ρ, the parameter for the degree of complementarities in technology 2, is set to −10.
In order to have a clear idea of how the implications of the model would change for dierent values of ρ, here I
show the results for ρ equal to -100, -1, 0.1 and 1. Calibrated parameters for this exercise are given in Table 10 and the moments are shown in Table 11 .
One can notice that as ρ increases, the corresponding κ decreases to keep the dispersion in workers' hours as low as that in the data. For the cases with ρ equal to -100, -1 and 0.1, substitutability between workers' hours is not too high and adjusting the weight of the rst technology prevents the model from generating outcomes that are too dierent from the benchmark.
However, if workers' hours are close enough to being perfect substitutes, the dispersion in hours worked loses sensitivity to the parameter κ. Eventually, κ is irrelevant for the case with perfect substitution (ρ = 1) and the model cannot match this particular moment. To be specic, in that case the model implies a variation 25 percent larger than the data.
As gures 8 and 9 show, the last case is also slightly dierent in terms of the distribution of changes in the hours of workers, even though those for the cases with higher complementarity overlap perfectly.
The case of perfect substitutability serves as a tool to show the role of exibility-related motives for entrepreneurship. By making the dispersion and changes in hours of workers be larger than what they are in the data, this modication leaves productivity (actual or expected) as the major determinant of entrepreneurial decision. Hence, relative income of entrepreneurs and the fraction earning more than the median worker is more than the benchmark and the data.
Volatile value of leisure
In the second set of alternatives, I show how the results change if one deviates from the benchmark calibration by choosing a dierent λ, the fraction of population that has volatile value of leisure. While this parameter is set to 0.6 in the benchmark, here I solve cases with λ equal to 0, 0.4, 0.8 and 1.
Previously, I showed the eects of abstracting away from one of the two non-standard features of the benchmark model, which captures the inexibilities in the labor market. Setting λ equal to 0 serves to show the results of ignoring the second feature, namely the presence of shocks to the value of leisure. There are two main avenues that the calibration for this alternative diers from the benchmark. First the persistence and the volatility of hours of entrepreneurs are not targeted in this alternative, as these are the two moments sensitive to the persistence and the volatility parameter of the preference shocks in the benchmark. Second, in the absence of the shocks assumed away in this alternative, the model falls short of replicating the dispersion for hours of workers, for any choice of κ. Hence I set κ to 1 to enable this alternative generate the highest possible dispersion for workers'
hours. Parameters used in this specication are given in Table 12 and the moments are documented in Table   13 . The moments that this alternative fails to replicate are related to the dispersion and volatility in hours of both entrepreneurs and workers. In the absence of shocks to the value of leisure, there is very little dispersion in hours worked by both occupational groups. Moreover, the mean absolute change in hours between two periods is very small for entrepreneurs and workers. This lack of movement in hours can also be seen in gures 10 and 11 documenting the absence of large changes in hours worked in this alternative.
While it is important to show the role of the presence of an unstable group with volatile value of leisure, it is also meaningful to show how the results of the benchmark calibration change across positive values of λ. Table   13 documents that the shortcomings of the alternative with only stable agents do not arise in other cases. With the presence of an unstable group that is large enough in size, the model is rich enough to match the persistence and the volatility of hours for entrepreneurs. Similarly, gures 10 and 11 show that the distribution of movements in hours for the two occupational groups do not dier much among the cases with positive λ. In the previous alternative, the process for the preference shocks are degenerate preventing the model from matching persistence and volatility of hours for entrepreneurs. As long as the size of the unstable group is large enough, hours patterns of entrepreneurs can be matched. Moreover, the variation in hours of workers gets large enough allowing a t for the dispersion hours by workers.
Restrictions on workers' hours
Many countries implement restrictions on the maximum length of a normal workweek, and a major goal of these policies is to achieve a better work-life balance. Recent examples of the tightening of these restrictions include countries such as Chile, France, Japan and South Korea. Lee, McCann, and Messenger (2007) . For details about the case of Japan, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002). 16 One can compare the average hours in the year before the given policy reforms by the average hours of people engaged for each country provided by the Penn World Tables 8.0. For France, 35-hour limit corresponds to a level 17 percent higher than the average hours before the reform. For Chile, this margin is at around 5 percent. For South Korea and Japan, the restrictions correspond to a level 15 and 9 percent lower than the average hours, respectively. The qualitative results are not sensitive to the selection of the upper bound on hours, as long as the threshold is not very large relative to the mean (so that the policy is actually relevant) and it is not very close to the mean (so that the restrictions are not very severe).
generate an increase in the number of workers at around 3 percent initially which becomes a 126 percent increase in the steady state comparison. Notice that the dierence between the initial response and the steady state comparison is much larger in this economy, because becoming an entrepreneur requires an opportunity shock. If the value of leisure is uniform in the population, as it is in the OS model, then maximum hours restrictions do not distort the selection into entrepreneurship as much, since the equilibrium variation in hours of workers is already low and the experimented upper bound does not make any signicant eect.
The left panel of Figure 13 shows the reduction in the average hours by workers after the policy reform. For the benchmark the change is around minus 1 percent throughout. Meanwhile, the change in hours in the alternative NC model is much larger than the impact in the benchmark due to the same reasons that give discrepancies between the two economies in changes in the number of entrepreneurs. The right panel documents that for the benchmark the ow of workers into salaried work is strong enough to bring the total hours by workers to a level 2 percent higher than the level before the reform. For the NC model, the fall in total hours is big; while the impact in the OS model is minimal.
Next, I turn to the impact on the productivity and hours of entrepreneurs. This set of results follows from the changes in the previous variables and are given in Figure 14 . Since many low productivity entrepreneurs that have self-selected themselves into entrepreneurship for preference reasons become workers with the reform, average productivity of entrepreneurs increases by around 1 percent initially and 2 percent in the long-run. For the NC model, the situation is reversed, with more individuals becoming entrepreneurs for preference reasons.
Nevertheless, one common prediction of these models is to have an increase in the average hours of entrepreneurs by around 4 percent, as the right panel of Figure 14 depicts.
Overall, the output in the benchmark economy, stays close to the prereform level, since the increase in the number of workers, entrepreneurial productivity and entrepreneurial hours counterbalance the reduction in average hours by workers and the ow out of entrepreneurship. I show this nding in Figure 15 . However, for the NC model, the decrease in output is large due to the large decrease in hours by workers and the fall in the number of workers in that economy. As in other aggregate moments, output exhibits little change in the OS model.
In addition to the eects on the aggregate moments, it is worthwhile to identify the winners and losers of the policy experiment of imposing an upper bound on maximum hours. Figure 16 shows the median welfare gains in the benchmark economy, for each percentile. The welfare gains of the median agent is very close to zero.
However, the left panel of Figure 17 shows that once we group individuals according to their types, we can see that the gains are dierent depending on the volatility of the value of leisure of agents. In particular, unstable types benet from the restrictions on the workweek because they either have a high value of leisure currently, or they are likely to have it in the following periods. On the other hand, most agents with no volatility in the value of leisure are worse o with this policy. As the right panel of Figure 17 illustrates, this also makes entrepreneurs'
gains from this policy larger than those of workers since entrepreneurs are more likely to be of the unstable type.
Conclusion
Entrepreneurs in the US, on average, earn less than comparable workers. In this paper, I develop a model that allows for a exible hours motive for entrepreneurship, disciplined to replicate the discrepancies in the patterns of working hours between entrepreneurs and workers, can generate this income dierential with a margin similar to the data.
I build the environment by generalizing a standard entrepreneurship model in two ways. First, I allow for idiosyncratic shocks on the value of leisure. This feature creates a need for exible hours. Second, I introduce a labor aggregation technology in which workers' hours are complementary to each other. This makes workers more productive when their hours are closer to those of their peers; hence brings a form of inexibility to the labor market and creates an additional motive for being an entrepreneur. This helps the model account for the low average income of entrepreneurs that is observed in the data. Moreover, this setting can explain (i) why entrepreneurs' hours are so disperse and volatile, (ii) why workers' hours are more concentrated and less volatile than those of entrepreneurs and (iii) why the movements in hours are not explained well by the movements in hourly income for either one of the two occupational groups.
I use my model to predict the consequences of a policy exercise that restricts the maximum length of hours for the workers in the US. The results show that such a policy can make salaried work a more attractive option for the individuals who have, or anticipate having, a high value of leisure. In the prereform economy, these individuals are likely to be engaged in entrepreneurship for reasons other than their entrepreneurial ability. Accordingly, the experimented policy can increase the number of workers by bringing unproductive entrepreneurs back to salaried work. This would imply an increase in the productivity of the entrepreneurial sector. Moreover, I show that switches into salaried work can be high enough to increase total hours by workers, despite the direct downwards eect of the maximum hours restrictions on hours worked.
There is a lack of studies focusing on hours worked by entrepreneurs. Naturally, this has prevented the literature from coming up with alternative production functions capturing entrepreneurs' contribution in the output of their rms. In this paper, I assume that entrepreneurs' hours change the productivity of the external factors;
and the calibrated weight of this input in the production highlights entrepreneurs' role in factor productivity.
Disentangling entrepreneurial hours from the exogenous shocks in accounting for rm productivity is important, as it can help us better measure the rm-level uncertainty. Correspondingly, further research exploring the form of the production function that takes into account the role of entrepreneurial hours is certainly needed.
Dierently from the hours of entrepreneurs, labor supply of workers and its elasticity has been studied extensively. Meanwhile, there is little consensus on the labor supply elasticity and how the equilibrium labor supply would change in response to policy changes. I argue in this paper that complementarities between workers' hours are important in predicting the changes in hours in response to supply or demand side shocks. I take advantage of this environment to estimate the consequences of restricted hours, but there are many other policies whose predicted eects would depend on the degree of the inexibility of hours and the mechanisms generating that.
Accordingly, extending the experiments in Section 7 by introducing policies such as income taxation and minimum wages can contribute to the literature looking at the eects of these polices on labor supply, aggregate output and welfare.
Finally, the proposed link between the inexibility of workers and entrepreneurship suggests a cross-country analysis pursuing the eect of such inexibilities on the economy. In particular, it would be important to study how well the number of entrepreneurs and their productivity can be accounted by (i) the variation in the degree of complementarities and (ii) the restrictions on the workweek that countries adopt.
Appendix
Solving non-entrepreneurial sector's problem
Maximization with respect to K b gives:
Now dene the eective labor in unit j ∈ {1, 2} of rm m as:
Then the FOC with respect to the number of workers to be hired with skill level y and hours l in technology 1 is:
if µ b1 (l, y) > 0. The maximization with respect to µ b2 (l, y) for l ∈ [0, 1] gives:
if µ b2 (l, y) > 0, where
Solving entrepreneurs' problem
Here I simply focus on the labor and capital demand of entrepreneurs, taking as given the hours they supply to their rms. The problem of maximizing prots for rm n is:
Maximization with respect to K n gives:
FOC with respect to the number of workers to be hired with skill level y and hours l in technology 1 is:
if µ n1 (l, y) > 0. The maximization with respect to µ n2 (l, y) for l ∈ [0, 1] gives:
if µ n2 (l, y) > 0 where
Next, I show an implication of competitive markets that will be useful in what follows to characterize the wage functions in equilibrium.
Claim: Suppose K b and {µ bj (l, y)} j∈{1,2} solve the maximization problem of a non-entrepreneurial rm b. Then for every entrepreneurial rm n, K n ≡ m n K b and µ nj ≡ m n µ bj solves the prot maximization problem, where.
Proof: We need to show that K n ≡ m n K b and µ nj ≡ m n µ bj satisfy the rst order conditions of an entrepreneurial rm n. First, notice that this implies:
Since K b and µ bj solve the 4, 5 and 6:
Hence the rst order condition for capital is satised. To see the same result for technology one labor demand notice that:
Finally, we need to show that the necessary condition for hours in technology 2 is satised.
(1 − κ)(1 − α)ηy
With this we establish that the proportional allocation solves the optimality conditions for entrepreneur n.
The implication of the above result is that in equilibrium, ratios of factors of production and relative size of labor aggregation units across rms is the same with that in the overall economy. Denote by M A and M B the set of entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial rms in the economy. Moreover, dene:
where the last equality follows from the previous claim. It also follows that for all n ∈ M A and b ∈ M B :
Next, I move to the characterization of equilibrium wage functions where I will use these results explicitly.
Equilibrium wages
I will now use the rst order conditions in equations 4, 5 and 6 to describe the equilibrium wage functions w 1 and w 2 . I will write these in terms of aggregate variables dened above. Using equation (4) we have that for any non-entrepreneurial rm b:
Then equation (5) gives:
Then using 10 we have:
showing that the wages in the rst technology does not depend on hours worked. On the other hand, Equation   6 shows that in an equilibrium where µ b2 (l, y) > 0, wages satisfy:
Then, using 10 and 11 we can write the price of hourly labor in technology 2 in terms aggregate variables:
Notice that we can also write the wage function in the second technology in terms of that in the rst one:
Tables and gures Note: The sample consists of individuals that keep being an entrepreneur or being a worker since the previous wave. The dependent variable is the absolute change (across two waves) in the fraction of usual hours worked. In (2) and (4), explanatory variables also include sex, marital status, race, disability, education, potential job experience, year dummies and the interactions between these variables. Hourly income change is the absolute change in the ratio of monthly income to usual hours worked.
Variables
Dependent variable: Absolute change in fraction of hours worked (1) (2) (3) Table 3 : Estimation of change in hours worked, using changes in demographics Note: The sample consists of individuals that keep being an entrepreneur or being a worker since the previous wave. The dependent variable is the absolute change (across two waves) in the fraction of usual hours worked. Hourly income change is the absolute change in the ratio of monthly income to usual hours worked. The change in the family size is absolute change in the number of persons in the family relative to previous period. The change in the marital status is the absolute change in the marriage indicator. Table 4 : Estimation of switching to entrepreneurship, using changes in demographics Note: The sample consists of individuals that were workers in the previous period. For the estimations, linear probability model is used. Dependent variable is the indicator of becoming an entrepreneur. Characteristics that are controlled for are sex, marital status, race, disability, education, potential job experience, year dummies and the interactions between these variables. The change in the family size is absolute change in the number of persons in the family relative to previous period. The change in the marital status is the absolute change in the marriage indicator. Percentile of gains 
